Lao PDR

UNDP News

20 June 2007

GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS

THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

20 JUNE 2007

Intervention on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme

Speech given by

Mr. Tim Horner

Senior Technical Advisor

UXO National Regulatory Authority Laos

Distinguished representatives, ladies and gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to address this forum on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). At the outset, UNDP would like to thank the Chair for the opportunity to present our perspective on the humanitarian and developmental impact of cluster munitions.

The UN has, for several years, appealed to the international community to address the inhumane effects of cluster munitions. In November 2003, at the Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee called on States to take immediate action to regulate the use of cluster munitions. In November 2006, in his message to the Third Review Conference of the CCW, the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan stated that “recent events show that the atrocious, inhumane effects of these weapons – both at the time of their use and after conflict ends – must be addressed immediately, so that civilian populations can start rebuilding their lives.” (1)And on 4 th April this year, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, reiterated his call on the international community to address immediately the horrendous humanitarian effects of cluster munitions.

So, why is UNDP so concerned about these weapons and supportive of legal measures to prohibit cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians and have a range of negative development impacts?

As many of you will be aware, UNDP has a global presence in 166 countries, of which some 80 countries are known to be affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW). At least 24 of the countries and territories where UNDP is present are currently known to be affected by cluster munitions. Thus, UNDP has first-hand experience of both the short-term humanitarian impact and the longer term development impact that these munitions have on populations and communities. They also hinder us from carrying out our mandate of working with national authorities to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in countries where we work.

And, nowhere is the devastating effects in both immediate post-conflict; and the long term developmental impact greater than in the country in which I work; the Peoples Democratic Republic of Lao.

In Lao PDR, vast quantities of cluster munitions were used between 1964 and 1973. The numbers are almost incomprehensible because they are in the hundreds of millions! This is in addition to the general purpose bombs, the chemical and herbicide use, the landmines and of course the Land Service Ammunition, such as, mortars and rockets utilised in the ground battles. This all took place during what was known as “the secret war” without an overt declaration of war against Laos , so exact details are difficult to obtain as I will explain.

Cluster munitions were used extensively; in offence, defence, and in some cases dropped to avoid having to return and land fully laden. The largest concentration of cluster munitions were dropped on targets in the “Plain of Jars” in the north east and in trying to stem the flow of military support through what we all know as the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” in the south east.

Very detailed records of targets, bomb damage assessments and of course munitions used were handed over by the US to Laos in 1998 some 25 years after the war. These records have become the best source of information we have but even with all the data contained in these records, we only know what the US Air Force used and not what the other protagonists used.

The US records show 288 million cluster munitions were delivered, although there are some discrepancies in the data which means we are unclear about exact number. Recent research and analysis by Handicap International (2) estimates that ‘at least 260 million cluster submunitions were delivered'. If we then consider a report from 1966 that concluded a 26% failure rate under test conditions at Nellis USAF base - there could have been in excess of 75 million failed cluster munitions in Laos just after the ceasefire. Whilst this figure is impossible to prove with any real accuracy, due to the difficult operational conditions in Laos with cluster bomb units often having landed in soft rice paddy or going through extensive forest canopy, we should expect a higher failure rate. The Handicap International report specualtes a percentage as high as 50%. What we can say with absolute assurance is that the units that failed to function, for whatever reason, remained, and continue to remain, on or under the ground as live, fused and primed indiscriminate killers.

We can also be accurate in saying that, after some 13 years of official clearance efforts by UXO Lao, they have managed to rid the country of approximately 350,000 (3) cluster munitions that had been deployed during hostilities but failed to function. But we have no idea at all of how many have been cleared by villagers. Initially villagers tried to remove or destroy them because they posed an immediate threat. Increasingly, however, poorer members of the community have sought out clusters munitions and ERW in general for its explosive content or scrap value – an inherently dangerous and life-threatening activity! If we extrapolate these figures, at the UXO Lao clearance rate, it could take 3,600 years to deal with the cluster munitions still remaining in Lao PDR.

In terms of the direct humanitarian impact, it is probable that there have been more cluster munition casualties in Laos than in almost all other contaminated countries put together. The Handicap International report (4) records 4,837 casualties in Lao PDR out of a total of 13,306 in 24 countries - this means Lao casualties represent about 36%. This said, we also know that the number of recorded casualties in Lao PDR has been, and continues to be, under-reported, and that the real figure could easily be double… or more.

We can say with some accuracy, from what we do know, that the impact has been carried entirely by the civilian population of the country. Of the 4,837 casualties recorded in the Handicap International report, none were either military personnel or deminers and it is particularly harrowing to learn that children make up a high proportion of these casualties – estimated to account for 44%. These are children whose basic rights to life and to enjoy a safe environment in which to grow, learn and play, have been denied.

Beyond the humanitarian impact, the presence of cluster munitions in Lao PDR is exacerbating poverty and blocking development. Cluster munitions are undermining food security and livelihood opportunities through land denial – approximately 25% of the land surface of Laos is contaminated by cluster munitions and 2,861 villages of 10,551 are affected (5). If we look at maps of where the reported accidents occurred, where limb disability statistics are highest, where food insecurity is at its worst and where the poorest and least developed districts are; the impact on development is undeniable.

In fact we can say that the result has been a huge and continuing burden on, mainly, the rural population and the environment of the country. Land is denied, agricultural expansion is constrained, forest management is disrupted, livestock and wildlife are killed, and insecurity is continually present. Consequently economic opportunity in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity is restricted, complicated and of course made more expensive. For example; in addition to almost one hundred million dollars (6) contributed to addressing the UXO problems since 1996 – the LXML mine has been spending up to 3 million dollars per year for more than a decade in clearing ERW to gain safe access to minerals. The large hydro power dam projects also spend considerable amounts of money clearing UXO for the dam sites and for the subsequent power cable routes. These are but two examples that go to confound the governments National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy, thereby impeding Lao PDR's ability to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The list of impacts and effects is endless.

Distinguished representatives, ladies and gentlemen,

In recognition of the humanitarian and development impacts of these weapons, UNDP and other UN agencies believe that it is time for the international community to urgently agree an effective legal instrument to prohibit cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. The humanitarian and developmental imperative demands that such a legal instrument be of the highest standards possible and be developed in the shortest time feasible.

Thank you.

(1) Secretary-General's message to the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva , 7 November 2006.

(2) Handicap International (May 2007) Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities , Brussels , HI , page 30

(3) This is a UXO Lao statistic and while it is the largest clearance capacity and has worked for the longest period of time it does not include other clearance NGO's or companies.

(4) HI (May 2007) op cit , pp 148-149

(5) Lao UXO National Regulatory Authority (June 2007) UXO Sector Annual Report Vientiane, NRA, Charman's Foreword, p 6

(6)The National Regulatory Authority has identified approximately $91,000,000 contributed to the UXO sector since 1996 but as donations have often been in-kind or records have not been held centrally it is impossible to obtain exact overall figures.